o close and yet so far. By the beginning of December, the thermometer had dropped to 45 degrees below zero Fahrenheit. It''s not true that the Germans were unaware of the Russian winter. But with limited supply capacity, priority was given to fuel and ammunition. Besides, who needs winter clothing if Moscow was supposed to be captured before General Winter struck?

距离如此之近却又如此遥远。到12月初，温度已降至零下45度之下。德国人并不是对俄罗斯的冬天不够了解，但是由于供应能力有限，得优先考虑燃料和弹药。而且，（如果按照计划），莫斯科本应该在冬季来临前被占领的，那时候谁还需要冬装？

Instead, it was the Soviets who struck. Stalin had been reassured by information from Richard Sorge, a German living in Japan but working for Soviet intelligence, that the Japanese would turn south to fight the Americans and British instead of north against Siberia. He felt able to transfer 18 elite Siberian divisions, well-trained and well-equipped for operating in harsh winter conditions, by rail to Moscow.

相反的，苏联人发动了袭击。生活在日本，但为苏联情报部门工作的德国人理查德送来的消息，让斯大林放心了，日本人将转向南方与美国和英国作战，而不是向北与苏联的西伯利亚地区作战。斯大林觉得能够通过铁路将18个西伯利亚的精锐师转移到莫斯科，这些师训练有素，装备精良，能够在严冬的条件下作战。

When the counter offensive began on December 5, German weapons were frozen, German soldiers were frozen, and sometimes the soldiers froze to the weapons. The survivors could only watch helplessly as the attackers, warmly clad in fur-lined jackets and boots, and camouflaged in white snowsuits, emerged like ghosts through the mist and snow.

12月5日反攻开始时，德国的武器被冻住了，德国士兵也被冻住了，有时候甚至士兵都被冻在了武器上。幸存者们只能眼睁睁地看着袭击者，穿着毛皮夹克和靴子，穿着白色的雪衣，像鬼魂一样在雾中和雪地里出现，（而毫无还手之力）。

Now came one of those decision points that occur in every major battle. Some of Hitler''s generals wanted to retreat to a line far from Moscow. But Hitler feared that a retreat would disintegrate into a panic-stricken rout that would bring the Red Army to the gates of Germany. He ordered his troops to hold their positions to the last man. Though Hitler fired some generals who disagreed, many German commanders later praised the decision as preventing a collapse like that suffered by Napoleon''s Grande Armee in 1812.

现在到了每一次重大战役中都会出现的决定性时刻。希特勒手下的一些将军们，想撤退到离莫斯科很远的地方，但希特勒担心撤退会变成恐慌般的溃退，使得苏联军队推进到德国的边境上来。希特勒命令他的部队坚守阵地直到最后一个人。尽管希特勒将一些持不同意见的将军解职，但很多德国指挥官，后来都称赞这一决定，称其阻止了像1812年拿破仑大军遭受的那样的崩溃。

The Germans were pushed back to Rzhev, 150 miles from Moscow. But their lines were still intact, and though battered, their armies were still ready to fight. And now it was Stalin''s turn for overconfidence. The Soviets had also suffered grievously during the counteroffensive: their troops were inexperienced, their supply lines were strained by snow and mud, and they also suffered from the cold. Nonetheless, with dreams of reaching Berlin in his eyes, Stalin ordered his exhausted forces to continue attacking. The result was heavy losses in futile attacks. By February, the Germans even counterattacked, destroying several Soviet divisions.

德国人被推回到距离莫斯科150英里的雷哲夫，但他们的防线仍然完好，尽管遭到重创，他们的军队仍然准备战斗。现在轮到斯大林过度自信了，苏军在反攻中也遭受了惨痛的打击：他们的军队缺乏经验，他们的补给线因为大雪和泥泞不堪重负，他们也遭受了严寒的折磨。尽管如此，斯大林还是满揣着到达柏林的梦想，命令精疲力尽的军队继续进攻，结果徒劳的攻击造成了重大损失。到了二月份，德国人甚至反击，摧毁了苏联的几个师。

What had been accomplished? Both sides had gambled and failed. German dreams of capturing Moscow and ending the War in the East had evaporated. Stalin''s dreams of a grand counteroffensive that would kick the Germans out of the Soviet unx also faltered. The slaughterhouse that was the Eastern Front would continue into 1942, and then into 1945.

结果是什么呢？双方的赌博都失败了。德国占领莫斯科和结束东部战争的梦想破灭了，斯大林发动大规模反攻，把德国人赶出苏联的梦想也步履蹒跚。东线战线的绞肉机一直延续到1942年，然后再一直延续到了1945年。

However, it was Hitler''s gamble that proved fatal. 1941 and 1942 would be the last years that the Germans had the luxury of waging a one-front war. After that, the Americans and British would open Second Fronts with amphibious landings in Europe and around-the-clock bombing over the Third Reich. If Hitler was to win, it had to be before the Anglo-Americans mustered their strength, and before the Soviets reorganized their armies and harnessed their vast industrial potential.

But the Russo-German War was no ordinary conflict fought over territory or resources. For Nazi Germany, it was a war of extermination and subjugation that would have killed the Russian people or reduced them to slavery. For the Soviet unx, it was a war of survival.

但苏德战争并不是为争夺领土或资源而进行的普通冲突。对纳粹德国来说，这是一场灭绝和征服的战争，它会杀死俄罗斯人民或将他们沦为奴隶。对苏联来说，这是一场生存之战。

The War in the East was a fight to the death, and neither capturing nor defending Moscow would change that. The Soviet unx would probably have fought on despite the loss of its capital.

东部战争是一场殊死搏斗，占领或者保住莫斯科，都不能改变这一局面。就算失去了首都，苏联也可能还会继续战斗。

在日本民间，日本人是如何看待美日太平洋战争的？


以下内容，译自美国知乎网站quora

原文标题为：

What gave Japan the idea they could defeat the United States during WWII, and who ordered the attack?

是什么让日本认为他们可以二战中打败美国，又是谁下令发动攻击的？

Dave Hiatt, former HPC Distributing Computing, CS/Physics Degrees
Answered Aug 9
What gave them the idea? The Japanese leadership developed the plan in an echo chamber, where only true believers were allowed to participate and all others who expressed doubt or disagreed were filtered out and removed from leadership positions in the civilian and military governments/institutions.
According to post war interviews with Emperor Hirohito it was Tojo who ordered the attack to take place prior to delivering a declaration of war to the US.

是什么给了他们这样的想法? 日本领导层在一个私下制定了这个计划，只有真正的信徒才被允许参与，所有其他表达怀疑或不同意的人都被过滤掉，并从文官系统和军事政府/机构的领导职位上移除掉。
根据战后对裕仁天皇的采访，是东条英机在向美国宣战之前下令发动攻击的。

The Japanese did not expect to “defeat” the United States in a protracted war.
Rather their plan was to hit the US Naval Fleet (which was stationed in Pearl Harbor) and render it ineffective for a period of time (their thinking was from between 6 - 18 months). During that period of time their plan was to hit the Far East possessions of Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and the US possessions of the Philippines, Wake, Guam, and Midway, and take the Solomon Islands, and Eastern New Guinea.

日本人没想在一场旷日持久的战争中“打败”美国。
相反，他们的计划是打击美国海军舰队( 驻扎在珍珠港 )，并在一段时间内使其失去战斗力 ( 他们的想法是6到18个月)，在那段时间里，他们的计划是袭击英国、法国、荷兰的远东属地，以及美国属地菲律宾、威克岛、关岛和中途岛，并占领所罗门群岛和新几内亚东部。

Their thinking was that this would allow them to form a defensive perimeter facing the US made of island strong points stretching from Midway in the North, through the Solomon''s, and across Dutch East Indies (current day Indonesia). It would also effectivly remove Australia and New Zealand as threats and make US, Australian, and New Zealand support problematic.
With this US facing defense in place they would move from Indochina (current day Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam), through Thailand, Burma, and into and through India.

他们的想法是，这将使他们能够形成一个面向美国的防御外围阵地，这些外围阵地由北部的中途岛，穿过所罗门群岛，横跨东印度尼西亚荷属东印度(今天的印度尼西亚) 构成，将有效地消除澳大利亚和新西兰的威胁，使得美国、澳大利亚和新西兰的支持成为一个问题。
在这种情况下，美国将不得不进入防御状态，他们将从印度支那 ( 今天的老挝、柬埔寨和越南)，通过泰国、缅甸，并进入和通过印度。

The thinking was that this would allow them to secure oil reserves (Indonesia), rubber (Indochina), and markets India (as a vassal state). And then turn their attention back to pacifying the parts of China they decided to keep as a colonial empire.
The plan assumed that the US, after recovering would look at this fortified Far Eastern wall would conclude that it would not be worth the trouble and money to try and take back and accept a Japanese proposed partition of the Pacific in return for peace and no further attacks from the IJN (Japanese Navy).
THAT was the plan. As I have said in other posts, the problem with a plan no matter how good is; “No plan survives first contact with reality”. And this one wasn’t that good, and definitely did not.

他们的想法是，这将使他们获得石油储备(印度尼西亚)、橡胶(印度支那半岛)和市场(印度，作为一个附庸国)，然后把注意力转回安抚他们决定作为殖民地帝国保留的中国部分地区。
该计划假定，美国在恢复之后，将重新审视这道防御严密的“ 远东墙”，并得出结论认为，美国将接受日本提出的分割太平洋的提议，以换取和平，不再受到日本海军的攻击。
这就是日本的全盘计划，正如我在其他文章中所说的，这个计划的问题在于，不管其计划得有多好，“没有计划能在与现实的第一次接触中幸存”，这一计划不算好，也绝对行不通。

Japan, even if their plan worked to perfection, still had to move raw materials and oil to an island nation, making that transit subject to naval attack.
The Japanese planners failed to grasp that army units holding strong point islands is not the same kind of overlapping defense as strong point units on land were the units can move to support one another.

日本，即使他们的计划完美实施，仍然不得不将原材料和石油转移到一个岛国，这使得原材料和石油的运输受到海军的攻击。
日本的规划者没有意识到，占据据点岛屿的军队不同于陆地上的据点部队，后者可以互相支援。

The only mobile support was Naval and Naval airpower. So when the Japanese quickly lost Naval superiority at Midway and lost air superiority with the arrival of the F6F Hellcat fighter, and then faced US air supremacy, the whole concept of interlocking support islands fell to pieces. Many island “strong points” simply became “island prisons” that were just passed by and left to sit with hundreds of thousands of soldiers effectively taken prisoner without anyone having to fire a shot.

其唯一的机动支援是海军和海军的空中力量，因此，日本在中途岛之战后迅速失去海军优势，随着 F6F 地狱猫战机的到来而失去空中优势，然后面对美国的制空权，连锁支援岛的整个概念就瓦解了，许多岛屿”要塞”变成”岛屿监狱” ，一路下去，一枪不发几十万士兵被俘。

They also totally misjudged what the civilian reaction to the attack would be and the extent to which the attack rather than cow the US, actually energized a willingness to carry the war directly to Japan,.
They also completely misunderstood how fast and how many ships the US could build. By 1945, the US had 150+ aircraft carriers deployed (of all classes from escort to fleet carriers), and a Navy of over 11,000 ships and landing craft of all sizes, and the US Navy was the 2nd largest air force on the planet (after the US Army Air Force).

他们还完全错误地判断了平民对此次袭击的反应，这次袭击没有吓倒美国，反而激发了直接向日本发动战争的意愿。
他们还完全误判了美国的建造速度和数量，到1945年，美国部署了150多艘航空母舰( 从护航到攻击航空母舰的所有级别)，拥有11000多艘船只和各种大小的登陆艇，美国海军是地球上第二大空军( 仅次于美国陆军空军)。

Kelly La Rue, I''m an American
upxed Aug 2
The Japanese leadership never intended to defeat, much less occupy the United States. They knew that was impossible. We didn’t know that and many Americans were in a panic fearing an invasion of the West Coast. This fear is the reason we rounded up and imprisoned Japanese civilians.
They did, like a number of other countries since, vastly underestimate our backbone, fighting spirit, and determination. They were contemptuous of our “softness”. We were not soft, just different, and nicer. If you don’t understand what I mean by nicer then that’s another question.
They hoped they could cow the United States long enough to complete their ambitions in Asia which were threefold:

日本领导人从未想过要打败美国，更不用说占领美国了，他们知道这是不可能的。
但我们不知道这一点，许多美国人因担心西海岸会受到入侵而陷入恐慌，这种恐惧是我们围捕和囚禁日本平民的原因。
他们确实像许多其他国家一样，大大低估了我们的骨气、战斗精神和决心，他们轻视我们的“温柔”，我们并不软弱，只是与众不同，而且更强，如果你不明白我说的更强是什么意思，那就是另一个问题了。
他们希望有足够长的时间威吓美国，以实现他们在亚洲的三重野心：

One: Conquer China and the other Southeast Asian countries down to and eventually to include Australia and the Midway Islands.
Two: Turn the Pacific into a Japanese lake. To this end they even invaded and held part of the Alaskan Aleutian Islands.
Three: Hand the US and her Allies a fait accompli. Once done they thought we would accept that they were the de facto ruler of all the territories they held.
The plan was ambitious but not impossible. But for some critical mistakes during the Pearl Harbor attack they might have succeeded. These mistakes was also threefold:
One: They didn’t get the carriers. These same carriers ended up tearing the heart out of their offensive naval arm and killing any chance of keeping their gains.
Two: They didn’t make a third raid to take out the maintenance arms and fuel storage thus allowing us to keep our fleet operating in the Pacific.
Three: Again they underestimated what we were capable of once they pissed us off.

第一：征服中国和其他东南亚国家，最终包括澳大利亚和中途岛。
第二：把太平洋变成日本内海，为此，他们甚至入侵并占领了部分阿拉斯加阿留申群岛。
第三：给美国及其盟国一个既成事实，一旦这样做，他们认为我们会接受他们是这些领土的实际统治者。

这个计划雄心勃勃，但并非不可能。
如果不是偷袭珍珠港期间的一些重大失误，他们可能已经成功了。
这些错误也有三方面：
第一：他们没有干掉航母，正是这些航母最终撕裂了他们进攻性海军的心脏，扼杀了他们保留任何战果的机会。
第二：他们没有进行第三次袭击来摧毁维护武器和燃料储存，从而使我们的舰队得以在太平洋上继续运作。
第三：他们低估了我们的能力，他们惹毛了我们。

Japan was not militarily or economically powerful enough to fight a long war against the United States, and the Japanese military knew this. Its attack on Pearland Harbor was a tremendous gamble — and though the short-run gamble was successful, the long-run gamble was lost because the Japanese were wrong about the American reaction.

日本在军事和经济上都不够强大，无法与美国打一场持久战，日本军方对此心知肚明。
它对珍珠港的攻击是一场巨大的赌博——虽然短期的赌博是成功的，但长期的赌博是失败的，因为日本人对美国的反应的认识是错误的。

After the Battle of Midway the Japanese were defeated. It just took them a few years of further defeats to accept this. Actually even after they realized they had lost the war they didn’t surrender, partly because of their ideology but also for a more practical reason. They were holding out for a treaty that allowed them to keep at least some of their gains.

中途岛战役之后，日本人被打败了，花费数年时间，他们只能接受这个事实。
事实上，即使他们意识到他们输掉了战争，他们也没有投降，部分原因是他们的意识形态，但也有更实际的原因，他们坚持要求签订一项条约，允许他们保留至少一部分所得。

Roosevelt and Truman were having none of that. They either surrendered unconditionally meaning the US would set the whatever terms it liked giving Japan no say in whether they kept the emperor or not or it was the possibility of complete destruction. This was a hard one to swallow and they weren’t going to until the Emperor, so horrified after the bombs destroyed two important cities, realizing Japan might be turned into a cinder, insisted they accept Allied terms. It is possible the entry of the Soviet unx into the war played a part in the decision but the Emperor in his announcement to his people credits the bomb for his decision.

罗斯福和杜鲁门都拒绝接受，他们要么无条件投降，这意味着将由美国按照喜好设定条件，日本在是否保留天皇的问题上没有发言权，要么就是完全毁灭。
这是一个难以接受的事实，直到原子弹摧毁两座重要城市后，天皇深感震惊，意识到日本可能会变成一片废墟，他们只能接受盟军的条件，苏联加入战争可能在这个决定中起了一定作用，但是天皇在他对人民的通告中把这个决定完全归结于原子弹。

Neal Elkind, I was lucky enough to meet a man that survived Iwo Jima
Answered Jul 31
That’s a damn good question. It’s not so much they believed they could defeat the US, but their opinion of us was that we were lazy, indifferent, and had no stomach for war.
Admiral Yamamoto who had lived in the US and knew the capabilities of our production cautioned the Japanese leaders “do not underestimate the power of America and what their capable of”.
The problem that Japan faced was called victory disease, they had never lost a war or battle, and had defeated Russia in the war of 1905, and were starting to believe their own propaganda.

这是个好问题。
他们并不认为自己能打败美国，但他们对我们的看法是，我们懒惰、漠不关心，对战争没有胃口。
曾在美国生活过、了解我们生产能力的山本海军上将告诫日本领导人，“不要低估美国的力量及其能力”。
日本这种病叫“ 胜利病”，他们自觉从未输过一场战争或战斗，并在1905年的战争中击败了俄罗斯，开始深信自己的宣传。

Yamamoto was asked to devise a plan for taking out the US right from the start, and he along with trusted aides came up with the Pearl Harbor attack. He did expressly made it clear that Japan declare war before the attack.
He also said I can guarantee that for 6 months we will run wild and take all we attack, and damn if 6 months later the Midway day disaster started the eventual demise of japan. It’s rather spooky when you think about it how exact he was in this prediction he made?
Well we know that no declaration was made, and he said “I’m afraid all we have done is awakened a sleeping giant, and filled him with a terrible resolve”. How true he was, and 3 1/2 years later japan had been pulverized by a lazy, weak, and indifferent nation.

山本被要求从一开始就设计一个消灭美国的计划，他和他信任的助手一起想出了偷袭珍珠港的计划，他明确表示日本在进攻之前就宣战了。
他还说，我可以保证，6个月内我们会疯狂地进攻，该死的，6个月后中途岛的灾难最终导致日本的灭亡，当你想到他在这个预言中有多么精确时，你会不会觉得相当恐怖？
我们都知道日本没有宣战，但他说： “恐怕我们所做的只是唤醒了一个沉睡的巨人，并使他产生了可怕的决心。”，三年半以后，日本被一个懒惰、软弱、漠不关心的国家粉碎了。

Kevin Delamer, Professor of Strategy at US Naval War College (2007-present)
Answered Nov 3
Japan was guilty of what some strategists call scxt writing. In both the Russo-Japanese and Sino-Japanese Wars, Japan took on numerically a financially more powerful adversaries. In both cases, an initial surprise attack neutralized the opponent’s navy. This had a demoralizing effect on the adversary. Each time, Japan fought a limited war against a diplomatically isolated opponent.

日本犯了一些战略家所说的“剧本错误”，无论是日俄战争还是中日战争，日本都在数量上和经济上更强大的对手较量，这两场战争中，最初的突然袭击都会使对手的海军失去作用，这对敌人的士气产生了打击， 每一次，日本都是与一个外交上孤立的对手进行一场有限的战争。

Jay Faulkner, lives in The United States of America
upxed Dec 3
I believe it was likely their experience with Russian empire during the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese war. The Russians had the resources to win, but they were mostly located in Europe. The Japanese defeated what the Russians were able to get to Asia. The Russians then gave up.

我认为这很可能是他们在1904年至1905年间与俄罗斯帝国打交道的日俄战争，俄罗斯人拥有获胜的资源，但他们大部分力量在欧洲，日本人打败了俄国人，然后俄国人放弃了。

I believe the Japanese hoped that something similar would happen with the United States. In other words, the Japanese didn''t believe they could win a long sustained war. They thought they would inflict a lot of early, smashing defeats and leave the US faced with a Pacific fortress area that would take years to reconquer. They thought the Americans would then just negotiate a peace deal and live with it.

我相信日本希望类似的事情会发生在美国身上，换句话说，日本人不相信他们（美国）能够赢得一场持久的战争，他们认为，日本可以造成美国早期的惨败，让美国面对一个需要多年才能重新征服的太平洋要塞地区，他们认为美国人会通过谈判达成和平协议，然后接受这个协议。

The Japanese lived in an isolated, racially homogeneous society that left them rather ethnocentric. They regarded the diverse population of the United States as a weakness, i.e. a people who couldn''t get on the same page and withstand the rigors of war long enough to win a difficult, sustained fight over a period of years.

日本人生活在一个孤立的、种族单一的社会，这使他们相当具有种族中心主义，他们认为美国多元化的人口是一个弱点，也就是说，日本人认为美国无法达成社会共识，无法经受住战争的严酷考验，无法在长达数年的时间里赢得艰难而持久的战斗。

Japan''s Navy was skeptical of this view because many of its higher ranking officers had been groomed by the service to have experience living/working abroad. Yet, the Army was the key decider in this case, and its officers were as insular as the broader Japanese population, and probably even more so.

日本海军对这种观点持怀疑态度，因为许多高级军官都是由海军培养出来的，他们都有在国外生活和工作的经验，然而，军队是这次事件的关键决策者，其军官与广大日本民众一样保守，甚至可能更加保守。

The key goal of the Japanese was to secure natural resources sufficient to sustain its hold over those parts of China that it had conquered. They had two choices to attain those resources: attack the Soviet unx or attack the European and American colonies of Asia. The Japanese Army had been defeated by the Soviet Red Army in 1938 and again in 1939. These disastrous outcomes had made believers out of the Japanese Army. Its leaders thought that attacking the Europeans and Americans would be the easier path to victory.

日本人的主要目标是获得足够的自然资源，以维持其对中国等被其征服的地区的控制。
要获得这些资源，他们有两个选择：要么进攻苏联，要么进攻欧洲和美洲的亚洲殖民地。
日本军队在1938年和1939年先后被苏联红军打败，这些灾难性的后果使得日本军队认为此路不通，其领导人认为攻击欧洲人和美国人才是通往胜利的捷径。

he Pearl Harbour attack was meant to cripple said naval assets so that Japan could continue its plans as well planned. They believed that the US would take about 1 to 2 years to recover from the attack and by then most major territories would have been occupied and fortified thus not allowing the US a suitable landing zone for intervention.

袭击珍珠港是为了削弱上述海军力量，以便日本能够继续其精心策划的计划，他们认为美国需要1到2年的时间才能从攻击中恢复过来，到那时大多数地方都已被日本占领并加固，美国会找不到合适的登陆区进行干预。